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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy, after a period of apparent stagnation,
is now undergoing a new era of development. This right which
has been variously called "the right of an inviolate personality,"
"the right to be let alone;" "the right to be free from unwarranted publicity," and "the liberty of silence," has been admitted by recent cases to an entirely new and distinct field of
usefulness. Not only is the right becoming more secure in its
recognition but also less limited in its application. In the
instances referred to the new growth has taken place in jurisdictions which long have recognized the right of privacy as a
common law right. In each case the predicted status of the
doctrine of privacy seems now ,lose at hand: "But if privacy
is once recognized as a right entitled to legal protection, the
interposition of the courts cannot depend on the particular
nature of the injuries resulting."' For a long time after the
right was first accorded judicial recognition it seemed that
such a standing would not soon be realized. Even where the
right was recognized its application was strictly limited. Seldom
was it invoked except for a single stereotyped set of facts. This
stereotyped case in which the doctrine was applied almost always involved the unauthorized use of a person's name or picture for advertising, purposes.
In this particular it is believed that the right of privacy
was largely the victim of circumstance. Of course the difficulty
of finding a derivative basis for the right of privacy and the
corresponding difficulty of working out a tationale for the doctrine had something to do with its limited application. The
courts confused the nature of the right; there was uncertainty
IBrandeis and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
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as to whether the right was a property right or a personal right.
Inasmuch as literary property rights were adopted as the derivative basis for the right of privacy by most of the early cases
the typical advertisement case furnished an ideal set of facts
which involved both personal and property interests: it was a
case of "privacy affected with a commercial interest."
Nevertheless it is believed that the main reason the right of privacy
was not in-Voked in cases involving a greater variety of facts
was largely a matter of circumstance. It so happened that the
three leading early cases which thoroughly tested the right
of privacy after it had been set forth by law publicists happened
to involve this identical set of facts. 2 All three cases, arising
in widely separated jurisdictions, were advertisement cases. In
the only one of these three jurisdictions which refused to recognize the common law standing of the right a statute was subsequently passed wlich incorporated this very same set of facts
in. the cause of action which it created and termed the whole
creation "the right of privacy. ' 3 This is believed to have had
no little effect in giving rise to the false impression that this
constituted exclusively the right of privacy.
Not unlike the growth of other newly asserted rights has
been the growth of this right. We might well have expected
the period of dormancy and stagnation which followed its first
utterance and recognition: such a period is quite characteristic
of natural growth. Yet this same period of dormancy is equally
a promise of the growth and development which is at hand.
To be sure this new development of the right of privacy furnishes a striking example of the adaptability of the common
law to the demands of a changing society. In no less a manner
it illustrates the power of the law school teacher and law
publicist. Prior to 1890 the right of privacy as such was practically unheard of.3a At this time there appeared in the Harvard Law Review a very able article on the subject which was
the joint work of Louis A . Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren. 4
.Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co., (1902), 171 N. Y. 538, 64
N. E. 442, 89 A. S. R. 828, 59 L. R. A. 478; Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co., (1909), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68; Milburn Co. v. Chinn
(1910), 137 Ky. 834, 127 S. W. 476.
This statute is discussed infra as a separate subject.
2
a But we do find scattered references to the right as, for instance,
in the case of De May v. Roberts (1881), 46 Mich. 160.
1"The Right to Privacy," 4 Harvard Law Review 193.
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This article was not only the chief cause of the recognition of
the right by the courts but it was also comprehensive enough to
have been largely instrumental in this latter day extension of the
right.
After the close of the first period of recognition which followed the publication of this article a law publicist said: "A.
stage has now been reached where immunity should be afforded
against the use of one's personality for private gain by others,
or to feed a prurient curiosity. " 5 We might have expected
that with the advent of the tabloid and similar journalism the
right of privacy would have been seized upon as a much needed
-protection. But curiosly enough this has not been the avenue
of pre-eminent development. Along with the rise of this type
of journalism there has come a corresponding and parallel indifference on the part of the public, to its inroads on privacy.
Many have been willing to agree with the press agent of a noted
comedian when he facetiously said: "Any publicity, even
though unfavorable, is better than none at all." So this new
development has occurred where it was less expected. Yet
here again the growth is not unnatural. As soon as the recognition of new rights or of new channels of redress has become sure,
men have employed fictions to use the new-found protection to
meet existing needs. New rights are developed up until the
stage of recognition by analogy to existing rights. Once recognized, however, the new right may become independent in
character or it may become interrelated to the prior existing
rights. In the case of the right of privacy the development has
taken the latter course. Especially is this evidenced in the more
recent cases. The right has been used to bolster up other analogous rights in places where technical restrictions appeared to
obstruct their greatest usefulness.
It is not the purpose of this article to re-examine the foundation work of the right of privacy. Any such handling would
be of necessity largely a repetition of the work so ably accomplished in the early Harvard Law Review article already referred to. Nor is it within the scope of this article to discuss privacy cases which do not center around personality. It is true
that "the great citadel of privacy is the home. It is there that
512

Columbia Law Review 693.
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the most intimate of human affairs are housed''Sa. But it is
obvious that this phase of privacy is a complete subject in itself.,
Rather it is the dual purpose of this article to give a somewhat
comprehensive review of the situation n the states which have
refused to recognize the right, on the one hand, and to trace the
development which has occurred since the publication of that
article in the jurisdictions which have accorded the right a
common law standing, on the other hand. In the former case
especial stress will be laid upon the situation which has developed in New York and the consequent problem of handling the
matter by statute; while in the latter case the latest turn in the
development as represented by two recent cases will be considered. To this end the various matter will be discussed under
the following heads:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Right Rejected
New York Status and Statute of Privacy
The Right Recognized
The Right of Privacy in Other Countries
Limitations to the Right
Remedies
Recent Development of the Right.
TE RIGHT REJECTED

Three States, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington
respectively, have flatly rejected the right of privacy, while a
fourth State, Michigan, in a more doubtful case also has rejected
the right and refused it a common law standing. In the first decided of these cases the entire doctrine is considered 'Ind rejected
by a divided court. This New York case, its background, its history, its basis, and the result which it produced are discussed
infra as a separate subject. Inasmuch as the other cases involve
much the sane reasoning they will not be considered in detail
but the additional reasons given by the courts for rejection will
be noticed. In the Rhode Island case 6 the defendants published,
in connection with their advertisements, a picture of the plaintiff seated in an automobile in connection with certain words relating to the price and quality of the garments worn by those
represented in the picture. The case is somewhat peculiar in
,a Ward, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity against Searches
and Seizures,
34 West Virginia Law Quarterly 137.
0
Henry v. Cherry (1909), 30 R. I. 13, 73 1A.97, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
991.
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that the declaration was in trespass vi et armis yet the case is
cast squarely on a supposed right of privacy and it was so considered by the court. The court held that a person has no right
of privacy for the invasion of which an action for damages lies
at the common law. The court was quite willing to admit the
desirability of some protection of privacy but said that the function of adjusting remedies was a legislative and not a judicial
one. The court erred, however, in at least one point in its definition of the right which it refused to recognize. The court
over-painted the picture when it said: "These definitions show
that the right of privacy contended for would embrace all forms
of interference with the mental well-being of an individual,
whether by publishing his picture, by gossip, or by pointing him
out as possessed of peculiar qualities." The propounders of the
right had specifically set forth that, "The law would not grant
any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in
the absence of special damage. ' '7 Nor had any case gone beyond
this limit.
In the Washington case8 the defendant newspaper published a photograph of the plaintiff as a part of an article
which stated that her father was charged with a certain crime.
There was a code provision in Washington which provided that
it should be libel "to expose dny living person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or to deprive him of the benefit of
public confidence or social intercourse." And yet the court
held that the publication of the photograph was not actionable
either as statutory libel or as a violation of the right of privacy.
In criticising this decision a note writer has well said: "To
print a picture of a prominent millionaire's daughjer as a part
of a story that her father was indicted and would be arrested
for a penitentiary offense, would not, holds the Washington
court, 'tend to deprive her of social intercourse among rightthinking people, but would rather tend to excite pity for her.'
It is submitted that the psychological ratiocination of the court
will not bear close scrutiny. " 9 It would seem that under a more
liberal interpretation this statute might have protected the substantial rights of privacy itself, even if the court were unwill14
8 Harvard Law Review 193, 217.
HRIman v. Star Publishing Go., (1911),

594, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 595.
9 10 Michigan Law Review 335.

64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac.
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ing to accord the right of privacy as such a common law standing. Nevertheless the court was not only udnwilling to allow
what appears a less liberal interpretation of the statute but also
specifically rejected any right of privacy.
A fourth state, lichigan, is supposed to have denied the
right of privacy.' 0 The court refused to restrain the use of the
name and likeness of a deceased person as a label for a brand of
cigars namd after him. While the court said it would not
allow a remedy in such a case, however desirable it might be,
"so long as such use does not amount to a libel," the authority
of the case has been denied.' on the ground that the case could
have been disposed of otherwise, as the person whose right had
been infringed was dead and as the right being personal died
with him. 12 The total rejection of the right of privacy by this
case has been said to be obiter yet the case is generally cited as
denying such a right. It seems that it should be taken as authoritative since the basis suggested as a substitute would be in affirmation of the right, a position which the court expressly refused
to take. In connection with this case it is interesting to note
2a
that the court nowhere referred to the Michigan case of 18811
in which the court, in allowing damages in an action on the
case against a doctor for bringing a person other than a physician with him to attend childbirth said: "The plaintiff had a
legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and
the law secures to her this by requiring others to observe it, and
to abstain from its violation."
The only other case denying the right of privacy is a case
arising in Illinois and decided by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.' 3 It is, however, a very weak case for the rejection of
the right: The case involved the publication by a newspaper of
an advertisement containing a portrait of a woman, together with
a statement calculated to convey the idea that she was a nurse,
and had personally used and as a nurse recommended the use
of, a certain brand of whisky as a tonic. One of the two counts
"Atkinson v. Doherty (1899), 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285, 46 L. R.
IA.219.
3 Michigan Law Review 559, 561.
See note 67 infra and text at that point for a detailed consideration of this element.
"a Cited supra note 3a.
2Peck v. Tribune Co., (1907), 154 Fed. 330. But see Von Thodor.
ovick y. Franz Joseph Beneficial Ass'In (1907), 154 Fed. 911.
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was in libel while the second was for an alleged violation of the
right of privacy. While the court did not expressly deny such
right, the decision seems a negation of the right in regard to
one of its essential elements. The court reasoned that in some
states the maxim de minimis non curat lex applies when there
is no malice shown and that hence nominal damages could not
be allowed in such a case. It was said that the defendant newspaper could have had no malice since it stood in the relation' of
printer and distributor only, acting without knowledge that the
face printed and distributed was that of the plaintiff, and was
not that of the person whose face it purported to'be. Now it
has been clearly set forth in respect to the right of privacy, that,
"The absence of 'malice' in the publisher does not afford a defense.' 4 The decision in the instant case would appear to be
an abrogation of this rule, and to that extent a neghtion of the
complete right of privacy.
NEw YORK STATUS AND STATUTE OF PRIVACY
The status of the right of privacy in New York is dealt
with here at some length because it is believed to be representativ6 of the result which may be expected from attempts to
handle the matter by statute. The earlier New York cases show
a decided inclination to recognize the right of privacy a8 a common law right. Up until the decision in the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.35 in 1902, the tendency in New
York was unmistakably toward such recognition. Had this tendency been carried to fruition it would have meant an orderly
growth and development of the doctrine within the common law
rather than without. There would have been no need for the
statute which was passed in 1903.
In 1891, one year after the publication of the article in
the Harvard Law Review entitled, "The Right to Privacy," and
eleven years before the Roberson decision, the case of Mackenzie
v. Soden' 6 impliedly recognized the right of privacy. In that
case the court restrained the unauthorized use of the facsimile
of a physician's signature to a recommendation for a medicine.
The recommendation was printed on advertisements, circulars
144

Harvard Law Review 193, 218.

171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 89 A. S. R. 828, 59 1;. R. A. 478.
18 N. Y. S. 240.
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and wrappers. The court termed this "an infringement of his
right to the sole use of his own name." It is not clear from the
decision whether the court looked upon the right as a personal
right or a property right. This implied recognition of the right
ripened into express recognition one year later in the case of
Schuyler v. Curtis.17 However this case was subsequently reversed in 1895 on the ground that the person whose privacy had
been invaded was dead.' 8 This would seem to indicate that the
court conceived of the right as being in the nature of a personal
right rather than a property right. But it may be that the
court "did not place its ruling upon any ancient branch of the
law but simply stated that the act to be enjoined is an unauthorized act which has caused and will in the future cause, dai.age.' 19 In connection with some of the later cases it is interesting to note that the act complained of in this case was the
placing in a public place of a statue of the person to portray a
"typical philanthropist."
The same year a peculiar yet interesting case arose which
further illustrates the early inclination of the New York court.2 0
Few cases even today carry the doctrine to such lengths. An
action was brought to recover damages allegedly occasioned by
the maintenance of an elevated railway in front of the house
owned by the plaintiff. The court upheld the argument of the
plaintiff that the rental value of some of her rooms had been
affected by the fact that passengers and employees on the elevated railway station platform of the defendant company had
interfered with the privacy of the occupants by looking in. The
defendant company was held liable in damages for the consequent loss of rent.
The Superior Court of New York City affirmed the existence of the right of privacy again in 1893.21 Here an injunction
was granted against the unauthorized publication of the plaintiff's photograph in a popularity voting contest. The court
said: "An individual is entitled to protection in person as well
17 (1892) 24 N. Y. Supp. 512.
147 N. Y 434, 42 N. E. 22. See on this case 36 American Law
Register 745.
9 See note in 21 L. R. A. 283, 284. Compare Monson v. Tussaud, 10
Times L. Rep. 199, 277.
20
Moore v. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., (1892), 130 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 997,
14 L. R. A. 731.
"Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N. Y. S. 908.
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as property, and now the right to life has come to mean the privilege to enjoy life without the publicity or annoyance of a lottery contest waged without authority, on the result of which is
made to depend, in public estimation at least, the worth of private character or value of ability." The application of the right
of privacy, which was assumed to exist by the court, was sidetracked on a technical objection in a case which arose the following year. 22 Inasmuch as the court held that a parent should
not be granted an injunction for the interference of his infant
child's privacy it appears probable that the court considered
the right personal in nature. Of course these tests are not conclusive by any means as to what the court considered the derivative basis of the right of privaqy. It may be that the court
was only following the analogy to the law of libel so far as
remedies are concerned.
Not until the leading case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box 0.23 is the doctrine again considered by the New York
courts. It is not to be assumed, however, that the doctrine was
entirely overlooked in the intervening years. On the contrary
it is believed that the stage was being set for the climax. The
history of the Roberson case leads to such a supposition. The
case first found its way into the courts in 1890 and was before
the courts until the final adjudication in 1902. At a special term
of the Supreme court of Monroe County in 1890 a demurrer to
the complaint on the ground that it stated no sufficient bause of
action was overruled. 24 This decision was later unanimously
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division.2 5 The
Court of Appeals in June, 1902, reversed this decision by a four
to three vote.2 6 Whatever may have been the intent of Judge
Parker who delivered the majority opinion, this opinion has
been taken to be a complete denial of the right of privacy. In
any event it is certain that Judge Parker expressly refused to
recognize the doctrine as outlined by Brandeis in the Harvard
Law Review. His reasons for refusal were:
1. Lack of precedent;
2Murray v. Gast Lithographic Co., (1894), 28 N. Y. S. 271.
- 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 89 A. S. R. 828, 59 L. R. A. 478.
u65 N. Y. S. 1109.
71 N. Y. S. 876.
171 N. Y. 539.
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2. Fear that recognition might "open the floodgates of
litigation; "
3. Fear that recognition might result in a restriction of
the liberty of speech and freedom of the press.
The weakness of such reasoning was pointed out at the time
by Judge Gray who delivered the dissenting opinion and has
27
Of
been subsequently criticized by leading law publicists.
course failure to find exact precedent is a plausible objection if
true; but even then it was not an insurmountable objection.
Analogous English cases had repeatedly set forth the basic
rights which underlie the right of privacy. The earlier cases in
New York were quite satisfied with the precedent which these'
cases furnished. The common law of Judge Parker's would
seem an inelastic thing robbed of all its progressive features.
That the "floodgates of litigation" might be opened is not a legal
reason so long as the litigation remains legitimate. This objection might equally be raised to bar every development in our law.
Nor is the third objection any more tenable. The right of privacy is of course limited by the mandates.of fee speech and a
free press. But this limitation is upon the extent rather than
the character of the right. In a like manner is the law of libel
and slander limited; yet neither of these rights is entirely cut
off by the paramount right of free speech.
The decision was both unexpected and unpopular. As a
result of the case and the criticism which it evoked a statute on
the subject was passed in New York within a year after the case
had been decided.28 The first section of the statute makes it a
misdemeanor for a person, firm or corporation for advertising
or for purposes of trade without the written consent first obtained to use a person's name, portrait or picture. 25 a The
second section of the act provides for civil liability and affords
both the remedies of injunction and damages. Even exemplary
damages are allowable. 2 9 In the first case to test the statute
the court declared the provision for civil liability valid but declared obiter that the provision of the first section of the act
' 3 Michigan Law Review 559; 4 Columbia Law Review 438.
Is Chapter 132 of the Laws of New York of 1903, page 308.
28a Compare the Minnesota Statute against defamatory newspapers
as outlined in State v. Guilford, (1928) 219 N. W. (Minn.) 770. Minor
additions were made to the statute by the amendments of 1921. Laws
1921, c.501.
2Wyatt v. HcUreary Co., (1908), 111 N. Y. S. 86, 87.
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for criminal liability was invalid.3 0 However a subsequent case
before the New York Court of Appeals has sustained the validity
of both provisions of the act. 31 The statute was here held to infringe neither state nor federal constitutions.
While the statute terms the right which it creates the
"right of privacy" it may be well to inquire just how limited
an aspect of the right the statute actually covers., The similarity
between the hypothetical case which the statute develops and the
actual facts of the Roberson case is apparent. "The statute
merely recognizes and enforces the right of a person to control
the use of his name or portrait by others so far as advertising
or trade purposes are concerned.''32 For the most part the
cases have held to the rather narrow construction which this
first case placed upon the statute. It is difficult to see how any
other interpretation could be placed upon the statute when we
consider its wording. Then too the stahite is in derogation of
the common law according to the view of the New York court
and must needs be strictly construed. And so it has been held
that the right which the statute creates may be waived by contract. 33 Nor does the protection of the statute extend to a copartnership. 34 A person's picture has been held not to have
been used for "advertising purposes" unless actually a part of
an advertisement; and not for "purposes of trade" if used for
dissemination of information as distinguished from commerce or
traffic. 35 Nevertheless the same year the statute was held to
protect an author against republication under his true name,
without his consent, of books which he had published under a
,om de plume without copyrighting. Such use of his name was
held to be for purposes of trade. 36 It is interesting to note that
the court considers the right which the statute creates personal
in nature because in this latter case the author expressly dis37
claimed any literary property in the storiles.
Wyatt v. Mcreary Co., supra note 29.
3'Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., (1908), 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N.
E. 1097, 127 A. S. R. 945, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1143.
"Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., supra note 31.
"Fairbanks v. Winic (1923), 198 N. Y. S. 299.
"Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia (1916), 158 N. Y. S. 56.
"Jeifries v. N. Y. Ev. JournalPub. Co., (1910), 124 N. Y. S.780.
"Elis v. Hurst (1910), 121 N. Y. S 438. But compare the Mark
Twain Case (1883), 14 Fed. 728.
"See Pekas Co. v. Leslie (1919), 52 N. Y. L. J.1864, in which the
right was explicity declared personal in nature.
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But it must be remembered that it -is not "within the evil
sought to' be remedied by that act to construe it so as to prohibit the use of the name, portrait, or picture of a living person
in truthfully recounting or portraying an actual current event,
as is commonly done in a single issue of a regular newspaper. "38
Yet in the same case which set forth this fundamental distinction the facts are held not to bring the case within the class of
legitimate news because the plaintiff's picture and name were
used as the nucleus of a story which was admittedly a fiction.
The distinction is consistently drawn between cases in which the
use of a person's picture Is merely incidental to its publication
as news and cases in which there is an exploitation of such person
for monetary gain. 3sa And so a film manufacturing company
was enjoined from displaying the name ,an&picture of a woman
who was portrayed at a w'anan lawyer who had solved a murder
mystery. This was held to be exploitation rather than news by
the lower court. 9 Upon appeal, however, the injunction was
dissolved on the ground that the publication by moving pictures
was iegitimate news even though done for a profit. 40 The primary distinction: between news and exploitatioh which the lower
court had set forth was accepted by the Court of Appeals. The
decision of the lower court was based largely upon the case of
Binns v. Vitagraph Co.,41 and the higher court thought the decision was a misapplication of the doctrine of the Binns case. In
the Binns case the plaintiff's picture W¢as used in a story which
was admittedly a fiction to enhance its sale value; in this later
dase the picture was used as a part of the presentation of an
42
actual current event.

In an earlier case4 -a a publication in a newspaper of a story
falsely purporting to be written by the plaintiff, followed by a
short biographical. sketch, and relating in the first person an
"3Binns v. litagraph-Co., (1913), 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108;
Colyer v. Fox Pub. Co., 146 N. Y. 999; Merle v. Sociological Research
Film Corporation (1915), 152 N. Y. S. 829.
"a The Statute has no application to and does not prevent the
publication of a person's photograph without his consent in -a daily
newspaper In connection with ordinary news items. Morse v. Press
Pub. Co. (1908), 109 N. Y. S. 963.
"Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., (1917), 167 N. Y. S. 98.
(1919), 178 N. Y. S. 752.
41
Supra note 38.
42See 18 Michigan Law Review 437.
42aD'Alfomonte
v. New York Herald Co., (1923), 139 N. Y. S. 200.
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adventure in an Afriean forest in which the plaintiff and his
party rescued a yotung American from cannibals, and in which
the plaintiff performed feats as impossible as they were absurd,
had been held actionable under the statute. The court had
said: "The story would have been just as good (or bad) a one
as a literary production if the plaintiff's nAme had been .omitted,
and if no author's name had been appended. The obvious purpose of using the plaintiff's name was to 'give to the story an
attribute of verisimilitude and authenticity. This, as I consider,
was using the name for purposes of trade."
The New York Times of Saturday, November 10, 1928, carried an account of a New York Supreme Court decision rendered
the day previous which deals with this very same problem as to
just what use is "for purposes of trade." The news report of
the case follows:
Edna Ferber, novelist, And Doubleday, Doran & Co., In6., jublishiers
of her book, "Show Boat," won yesterday their application to dismiss
the complaint in a suit for $25,000 damages brought by Wayne Damron
of Catlettsburg, Ky., on the ground that his name was used in the book,

without his permission, for "purposes of trade," which is prohibited

by the Civil Rights law. The name "Little Wayne Damron" was used
in one chapter of the book and was alleged by the plaintiff to have re-'
ferred to him, and in an uncomplimentary manner, because it related
to ownership of "the Black Diamond Saloon" by "Big Wayne" and
"Little Wayne Damron."
Justice Gavegan said in his opinion that the Civil Rights law "was
not passed with the idea of interfering with the circulation of newspapers -pr the publication of books within proper limits, and the use of
'local color' was not outlawed." The Court said further:
"It goes without saying that literary expediency may not be
advanced as an excuse for violating the statute. It is well established that every incidental mention of some person's name in connection with advertising or trade does not constitute a violation
of the provisions under consideration. The single appearance of
-plaintiff's name iii this book is clearly not a use prohibited by
the statute. It would impose uncalled for burden and hazard were
we to hold that publishers and booksellers could not lawfully publish or deal in books without the production of genuine, written
consent, from every one mentioned even once, or that an author
coVld not lawfully mention any one without like consent."
Justice Gavegan said the sole question presented was whether "the
reference to the plaintiff at a single place in the book is a use for the
purposes of trade," and said that if the plaintiff's view of the Civil
Rights law should be upheld "it is apparent that consequences never
intended would follow from its enactment." Referring to the history
of the statute, Justice Gavegan said the Lbgislature enacted it a year
after the Court of Appeals in 1902 had refused to restrain a box company from using the name and photograph of a'young woman in advertising flour.
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This news report omitted the fact that an injunction was
also asked to restrain the sale of the novel, which fact the As.
sociated Press report carried by other papers, mentions. This
news item is inserted here for the purpose of showing that the
distinction which has been often followed between exploitation
and news may not prove entirely satisfactory in every case and
certainly will not be carried to an extremity. The term "local
color" is merely a convenient way of avoiding this distinction.
The most liberal view of the statute yet expressed by the
courts has certainly not been fulfilled in these cases we have considered. This liberal interpretation is found in the case of
Almind v. Sea Beach B. Company: "The right of privacy
under the statute cannot be invaded for purposes purely informative or redemptive, whether the altruist be entirely a charitable envoy or a railway company. No cause is so exalted that
it may allure by exposing the portrait of a person to public

gaze.

'43

But even with the most liberal interpretation does such a
statute satisfactorily protect the right of privacy? Of course it
is better than no protection at all, which was the situation in
New York immediately after the Roberson decision. Yet the
present status of themdoctrine in New York appears very unsatisfactory. Nor is the fault as much with the legislature as with
the court. The legislature was merely answering the popular
demand for a remedy in just such a case as the facts of the Roberson case presented. Other equally important phases of the
right of privacy are entirely unprovided for. The statute's rigidity and the consequent avenues of escape for the violator of
privacy leave the statute so -it affords almost no protection
against the tabloid and similar scurrilous journalism. It seems
quite unfortunate that the New York court should have taken
such a position. The interpretation of the statute in the subsequent cases together with the present status of the doctrine in
states which have recognized the right of privacy as a common
law right have amply justified the fears of law publicists at the
time the statute was passed: "It may well be doubted whether
legislative declaration and definition of this right will prove as
satisfactory, especially under rapidly changing conditions, as
will the judicial recognition of the right." 44 Or, as Dean Pound
*' (1913), 141 N. Y. S. 842.
8 Michigan Law Review 221, 222.
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has said: "A man's feelings are as much a part of his personality a4 his limbs. The actions that protect the latter from injury may well be made to protect the former by the ordinary
process of legal growth.' ' 4 If we must have a statute on the
subject, it would seem that it should at least be as broad as the
French code provision which extends the protection not only
to a man's name and picture but also to other phases of his
purely private life.''45a

Tnm RIGHT REcOGNIZED
The first two jurisdictions to recognize the right of privacy
as a common law right entitled to protection were Georgia and
Kentucky, respectively. Both of these state courts took this
position in spite of the fact that a divided court in New York46
and the Michigan court 47 had previously held just the opposite
in the first two cases to thoroughly test the right. Some hint as
to how the Georgia court would decide the question when it
should be properly presented might have been gleaned from a
case which arose some ten years previous to the present case.
In holding a certain statute4 8'unconstitutional the Georgia court
said in 1894: ". . . general private right of silence enjoyed
by all persons, natural or artificial, from time immemorial.
Liberty of speech and of writing being secured by the state constitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, not less important." 49 This early reference, indirect
though it may be, to the right of privacy has been overlooked in
49
the discussions of the later Georgia cases. a
In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.50 the defendant
published a picture of the plaintiff in connection with an insur4128 Harvard Law Review 343, 364.
'a Loi Relative a la Presse, 11 Mai 1868.
'Discussed supra as a separate subject.
4
Supra note (10) and text at that point.
49 See infra note (108)
for an explanation of the type of statute in
question.
19Wallace v. Georgia Ry. Co., (1894), 94 Ga. 732, 22 S. E. 579; In
Atchinson, T & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (1909), 80 Kansas 312, 102 Pac.
459, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 247, and in St. Louis S. W. By. Co. of Texas v.
Hiaon (1914), 106 Texas 477, 171 S. W. 703, L. R. A. 1917B, 1108, we find
similar language.
*a Yet the Georgia court also had to override objections raised in
earlier cases as for instance in Chapman v. Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. E.
9011 where it was said that the law does not undertake to redress psychological injuries.
10 (1904), 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68.
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ance advertisement. Under the picture were the words: "In my
healthy and productive period of life, I bought insurance in the
X Company; and today my family is protected and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid up policies." By the sidd
of the plaintiff's picture was the likeness of an ill-dressed and
sickly lboking person. Above the plaintiff's picture were the
words: "Do it now. The man who did," while above the other
picture were the words: "Do it while you can, The man who
didn't." Nowhere was the plaintiff's actual name used. The
court's decision cannot be taken as other than a complete recognition of privacy. In a very lengthy opinion the whole doctrine
was considered and accepted. The right is catalogued among the
absolute rights of personal security and personal liberty. The
court reasons that if personal liberty embraces the right of publicity (freedom of speech and press), it likewise embraces its
counterpart, the right of privacy; that a person has as much
right to choose seclusion as to go in and out among his fellow
men at will.51
It might be noted, however, that neither this case nor the
-cases which follow outline the derivative basis for the right
nearly so satisfactorily as did Brandeis in the early article. In
that article it was pointed out that rights which had. previously
been protected under supposedly different categories were in
reality centered around the protection of an inviolafe personality; that the unauthorized publication of letters, while termed
an infringement of a literary property right, was in fact a violation of privacy; that the process of implying a trust in such
cases, as some courts had done, *as in fact nothing less than
"a judicial declaration that public morality, private justice, and
general convenience demand the recognition" of the basic right
of privacy. 52 Such an elaboration by the courts on the bases for
the newly-recognized right and the consequent development by
analogy of the general concepts of personal liberty and personal
security would have done much to still the cry of "judicial legislation." Nevertheless these early cases had a correct idea as to,
52
the nature of the right affected. a
'Note
the similarity to the quotation, supra note (49), from an
earlier Georgia case.
4 Harvard Law Review 193, 205, 210.
=a See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harvard Law Review
343, 364.
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The Kentucky case53 involved the same type of facts, and
the court, in a less exhaustive but no less certain manner, upheld
the right in its entirety. The case was bitterly fought from start
to finish. Even after the final adjudication in the Kentucky
courts the defendant refused to pay the judgment which the
court had awarded, so a suit was brought thereon in the Federal Court at Buffalo, where the Kentucky judgment was
upheld.5 4 Upon appeal this decision was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. 55 Both the Georgia and Kentucky courts
held there was no need of proving special damages.
These two cases are quite typical of most of the early cases
on the subject. Since the date of the latter case similar cases
have been similarly decided ih the following states: New Jersey,5 6 Missouri, 57 and Kansas." s In the case of Kansas we find
a similar situation to that already noted in Georgia, namely the
Kansas court nine years previous to the Kansas case mentioned
above indicated a favorable handling of the right of privacy
when it said in the case of Atchinson, T. & S. P. R. Go. v.
Brow : 9 "It would spem that liberty to remain silent is correlative to the freedom to speak. If dne must speak, he cannot
be said to speak freely." In both the Georgia ease and in the
Kansas case the right of privacy was first recognized in this indirect and incomplete fashion as a constitutional right rather
than as a right for the violation of which a tort action, might lie.
In both cases the recognition of the constitutional right antedated the fuller recognition by approximately the same period
of time. Another state court has also referred to "the natural
right to speak or be silent," 60 but has not as yet been called
upon to extend the recognition in a tort action for damages. In
another part of this artele we refer to a similar parallel in the
states of Georgia and Kentucky between the first recognition ok
i
13Milburn Go. v. Chinn (1907), 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364.. Final
adjudication by the Kentucky court: (1910), 137 Ky. 834, 127 S. W. 476.
For the local background and a detailed history of the case see 4 Kentucky Law Journal 22.
14195 Federal 158.

4' 202 Federal 175.

"Edison v. Edison Mfg. Co., (1907), 73 N. J. E. 136, 67 A. 392.
11Munden v. Harris (1910), 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076.
13Kunz v. Allen (1918), 102 Kansas 883, 172 P. 532, L. R. A. 1918D,
1151. Commented on in 28 Yale Law Journal 269.
(1909), 80 Kan. 312, 102 P. 459, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 247.
,t. Louis S. W. By. Co. of Texas v. Hixon (1914), 106 Texas 477,
S
171 S. W. 703, L. R. A. 1917B, 1108.
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the right of privacy in the typical "picture-ad" case in each
state and the recent extension of the application of the right in
each state. 61 Of course these parallels are merely the creatures
of chance but they are interesting nevertheless. We might also
note that the Kansas case is a modern variation of the conventional "picture-ad" case, for in this case the exhibition of the
62
plaintiff's picture in a motion picture theater was restrained.
Apart from these cases there have been but few cases until
the two most recent cases which have upheld the right of privacy. There was a single early New York case which went to
some lengths in upholding the right. 63 Yet, inasmuch as the
New 'York court later repudiated the entire doctrine of privacy
in a ease involving the typical advertisement elements only, this
much more liberal application of the doctrine has been rendered
all the more a nullity in that state. -Then there are three more
or less anomalous cases bearing on privacy. In one of these the
Massachusetts court gave utterance to a statement on privacy
which was pure obiter but which has been taken to have an important bearing on a different aspect of privacy.6 4 The action
was brought to restrain the publication of certain private letters
of a deceased person, and the case was disposed of on grounds of
literary property law. Yet the court said: " . . . the very
nature of the correspondence may be such as to set the seal of
secrecy upon its contents. See Kendrick v. Danube Collieries &
Mineral., 39 W. R. 43. Letters of extreme affection and other
fiduciary communications may come within this class."
In a Kentucky case6 5 a photographer was held liable in
damages for usiilg a photograph of a person's malformed child
for purposes of his own when he had agreed with the person
not to do so. While this case may be explained on the basis of
the violation of a purely contractural obligation rather than the
0See infra note (129) and text at that point.
"See also Binns v. Vitagraph Co., (1913), 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N.
1108; Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corporation (1915), 152
Y. S. 829; Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., (1917), 167 N. Y.
98, (1919), 178 N. Y. S. 752.
"Moore v. N. Y. Elevated R. Co., (1892), 130 N. Y. S. 523, 29 N.
997, 14 L. R. A. 731. Discussed more in detail supra note 20.
14 Baker v. Libbie (1912), 210 Mass. 559, 97 N. E. 109.
"Douglas v. Stokes (1912), 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849, 42 L. R.
(N. S.) 386.
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violation of any right of privacy, 66 a large portion of the opinion
is given to this latter consideration. The court said: "The
photographer had no authority to make the photograph except
by their (the parents') authority, and when he exceeded his authority he invaded their right. We do not see that this case can
be distinguished from those involving the; like use of the photograph of a living person, and this has been held actionable.
. .
The most tender affections of the human heart cluster
about the body of one's dead child. A man may recover for an
injury or indigmity done thd body, and it would be a reproach
to the law if these physical injuries be recovered for and not
those incorporeal injuries which would cause much greater suf.
.
If the defendant had wrongfering and humiliation.
fully taken possession of the nude body of the plaintiff's dead
child and exposed it to the public view in an effort to make
money out of it it would not be doubted that an injury had been
done them to recover for which an action might be maintained.
When he wrongfully used the photograph of it, a like injury
was done; the injury differing from that supposed in degree but
not in kind."
Both of these last two cases involved also the question of
The first case
what has been called "post-mortem privacy."
held, as had other previously decided cases, 67 that since the right
of privacy was a personal right it died with the person. Yet the
latter case takes the position that the person whose feelings are
most vitally injured may be the surviving relative rather than
the deceased. It could not have been otherwise in the Kentucky
case. And yet there is no apparent reason why the same line of
thought might not equally hold good in the case of personal
letters of a deceased relative. 68 However the former case would
appear more in line -with libel and slander cases on the same
point.
'But see statement of Logan, J., in Brents v. Morgan (1927), 221
Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967, to the effect that the case could have been placed
on no ground other than the right of privacy. However Chapin on
Torts, page 241, note 7 takes a position contrary to Judge Logan.
'1 chuyler v. Curtis (1892), 24 N. Y. S. 512, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E.
22. Compare Von Thodorovich v. Franz Joseph BeneficiaZ Co., (1907),
154 Fed. 911.
"Compare also the case of Murray v. Engraving Co., (1894), 26
N. Y. S. 908, in which it was held that a parent cannot maintain an
action to enjoin the publication of the portrait of an infant child. See
also note 10, supra, concerning a Michigan case, and 9 Harvard Law
Review 354.
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The third case was not placed on grounds of privacy either
but involves in a less vital way a consideration of the right.69
A false record as to an infant's parentage was cancelled in order
to protect his vested property rights.
The only other cases involve photographs and descriptions
of lJersons accused of crime. It has been held that where a
person is not guilty of the crime he may enjoin the placing of
his photograph in the rogues' gallery.7 0 But another case has
held that the person who so places .nch a picture in the rogues'
gallery is not liable in damages. 71 ft is clear that if the person
has already been convicted of a crime he cannot object to Ids
picture being placed in the gallery. 72 A Maryland case78 has
held that the photographing and measuring before trial for purposes of identification by the Bertillion system of one arrested
on a criminal charge does not violate any of the rights of the
accused person, if the photograph is not to be placed in the
rogues' gallery, or the means of identification distributed prior to
his conviction. Other cases also have made this distinction between photographing criminals for purposes of identification
only and photographing them for purposes of publicity.74 While
not 'all of these cases have been placed squarely on the right of
privacy, and while it has been doubted whether any of them
should have been so placed, 75 it is undeniable that some of the
more iniportant of them were so placed by the courts. 75a As said
Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (1907), 72 N. J. E. 910, 67 A. 103. See
Pound's statement in 29 Harvard Law Review 676 that case could have
been 0put on privacy.
1 Itlcovitz v. Whitaker (1905), 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499, 1 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1147; Schulman v. Whitaker (1905), 115 La. 628, 39 So. 737, 7 L. IL
A. (N. S.) 274. See also 13 Cornell Law Quarterly 470. See also
Schwartz v. Edrington (1913),,133 La. 295, 62 So. 660, 47 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 921, which is said by Long in 33 Yale Law Journal 125 to prbtect
the right of privacy indirectly.
7.State ex rel., Bruns v. Clausmier (1900), 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E.
541.
" Hodgeman v. Olen (1915), 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122, L. R. A.
1916A,3 739.
' Downs v. Swann (1909), 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.)
.739.

, Mabry v. Kettering (1909), 89 Ark. 551, 117 S. W. 746, 122 S. W.
115; Miller v. Gillespie (1917), 196 Mich. 423, 163 N. W. 22, L. R. A.
1917E, 774.
1 21 Ruling Case Law 1200.
7a See also Magourik v. Tel. Co., (1901), 29 Miss. 622, 31 So. 206,
for a possible recognition of privacy or, at least, a basis therefor when
the proper case shall be presented; and detective "shadowing cases",
Schultz v. Insurance Co., (1913), 151 Wis. 537, 139 W. W. 386.
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in Itkovitz v. Whitaker: "Every one who does not violate the law
can insist upon being let alone. In such a case the right of privacy is absolute."

THn RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN OTMR COUNTRIES
It may form an interesting detour to inquire as to the
status of the right of privacy in lands other than our own. The
following notes are not offered as an exhaustive survey of this
problem but are rather intended to give a somewhat representative picture of the status of the doctrine in England, continental
Europe, and a few of the more distant and less progressive
countries of the world such as China and India.
As far as the earlier English cases are concerned it has
already been pointed out that,7 6 while they grant relief on supposedly different grounds such as breach of trost,77 literary
property rights,78 or trade secrets,7 9 they in fact center around
the protection of an inviolate personality. Indeed in the most
important one of these cases, the case of Prince Albert v.
Strange, Cottenham, L. C., said: "In the present case, where privacy is the right invaded, postponing the injunction would be
equivalent to denying it altogether." Nevertheless the injunction finally granted was placed on the ground that the defendant had been guilty of a breach of trust. In all of these early
cases the courts in their "groping for some established principle" were willing to stretch the existing categories of rights
rather than to place the case squarely on a supposedly new right,
the right of privacy. In this respect the fact that an injunction
was invariably asked anl that thereby the question of equity's
jurisdiction to protect rights other than property rights was
raised, is believed to have been largely influential.3 0
Nbr do the later cases in England evidence any material
change from this early position. Cases which might easily have
been placed on the ground of privacy, just as *the earlier cases
of Prince Albert v. Strange and Pollard v. PhotographicCom8

4 Harvard Law Review 193, 208ff.

Atfernethy v. Hutchinson (1825), 3 L. J. Ch. 209; Prince Albert
v. Strange (1849), 1 McN. & G. 25; Tuck v. Priest (1887), 19 Q. 3B. D.
639; Pollardv. Photographic Co., (1888), 40 Ch. Div. 345.
"In all of the cases cited in the preceding note the courts found a
property right In addition to the breach of trust.
"Morison v. Moat (1857), 9 Hare 241.
1 See also note 118 infra and text at that point.
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pany might have been placed, s ' have been placed again and
again on the conventional grounds. Take for instance a case
where the defendant without authority published the name of
the plaintiff as one who shared in the responsibility for the defendant's enterprise; and where the plaintiff sought to enjoin
such use of his name. The English court very promptly
granted the relief by extending somewhat the earlier law as to
trade marks and trade names.8 2 Or take another case, decided
in 1913, in which the publication of personal letters of the artist
83
Whistler, was enjoined on grounds of literary property law.
Similarly the use of letters improperly obtained was restrained. 4 Sometimes we find cases placed on grounds of libel
law which might have been placed on privacy.8 5
In those cases in which the plaintiff has been unable to place
his case on some right other than the right of privacy he has
failedSa The case of Gore~li v. Wal586 furnishes an outstanding example. In this case Marie Corelli, a well-known authoress,. sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing and selling post-cards on which were colored representations depicting imaginary incidents in her life, such as the feeding of a pair of small ponies by Miss Corelli. The report of the
case says'an injunction was "asked either upon the ground that
they were a libel upon her or that she was entitled to restrain
the publication of a portrait of herself without her authority."
The court was not satisfied that the cards were libellous so the
injunction was refused. Similarly an injunction against the
use of a physician's name with what purported to be a quotation
from him in advertising a proprietary medicine was refused in
8 See Wigmore, Select Cases on Tort, vol. 1, page 739ff, in which
the author listed these two English cases under the title, "Mixed
Harms: Loss of Privacy."
2Walter v. Ashton (1902), 2 Ch.282.
8 Phi7lip v. Pennell, 2 Ch. 577.
"Asburton v. Pafe (1913), 2 Ch. 469.
I'aMonson v. Tussauds ed., (1899), L. R. 1 Q. B. 671.
'a But we might note one more or less anomalous English case
which protects an aspect of privacy. Where a property owner brought
an action for the diminution of the value of his property resulting from
the construction of a railroad in his vicinity, the necessary invasion
of the privacy of a dwelling on his property was held a legitimate
element of damages. Bucclcuch v. Met. Board of Works, L. R. 5 H. L.
418. Compare this with the New York case cited in note 20.
(1906), 22 L. T. Rep. 532.
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the absence of elements of defamation or injury to his property,
87
business or reputation.
These English cases show the way the English courts have
chosen to handle the problems presented by the right of privacy,
namely, extend the existing principles of law rather than recognize a new principle or right. After all, the two methods, the
English and the American, may finally reach the same end, for
as we shall note toward the latter part of this article the right
of privacy in America is again interrelating itself with the
prior existing rights, and in so doing the right of privacy is extending these other fields of law in places where an extension is
needed.
Of the countries of continental Europe, France has shown
the most decided recognition of the right of privacy. By a provision of "the law of the press," passed in 1868, there is a prohibition against the publication of matter relating to the purely
private phases of life.88 There is a further provision of the
French Penal Code, similar to provisions of the Ottoman, Siam
and Chinese Penal Codes mentioned infra, which provides in
substance that physicians, surgeons, druggists, midwives, or
similar persons shall not disclose the secrets which have been
committed to them by virtue of their profession. 9
The Penal Codes of Turkey, 90 and the Kingdom of Siam,9 1
and the new Criminal Code of China, 92 all have provisions
similar to the provisions of the French Penal Code. The punishment inflicted on the violator by these statutes differs greatly;
in France the punishment is from one to six months imprisonment and from one hundred to five hundred francs fine; in
Turkey the imprisonment is from twenty-four hours to one
week, and a fine from "one Mejidieh piece of twenty to one
Mejidieh gold piece;" in Siam the punishment is "imprisonment
not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding five hundred
ticals, or both;" in China the penalty is "imprisonment for a
"8Dockerelv. Dougafl (1898), 78 L. T. Rep. 840, (1899), 80 L. T.
Rep. 556.
"Loi Relative a Ia Presse, 11 Mai 1868. Quoted verbatim in 4
Harvard Law Review 193.
"French Code Penal, article 378.
"0Ottoman Penal Code (Translation by Bucknill), article 215.
': The Penal Code for the Kingdom of Siam, section 280.
"Article 334.
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period of not more than one year, or with detention, or with a
fine of not more than five hundred yuan.'' 93
The provision of the Siamese Code goes further than the
others and provides that, "Whoever wrongfully discloses any
private secret communicated to him by reason of his functions
or profession," shall be punished as above stated. It may be
interesting to note that the same result hds been reached in England independently of any statute and that an injunction will be
granted to restrain a person in a confidential position from disclosing information with which he has become acquainted by
virtue of that relation. 94 Also in Switzerland independently of
the type of statute quoted above, much the same protection has
been afforded. However, the Swiss Civil Code does have a general provision to the effect that, "Where anyone is being injured in his person or reputation by another's unlawful act,
he can apply to the judge for an injunction to restrain the continuation of that act." 95 Yet this statute hardly covers the
case reported by Williams in his Sources of Swiss Law.9 6 The
qiqotation from Williams follows: "Breach of professional secrecy does, however, violate a personal right, namely the right
to have one's privacy respected. So in the case of Hilfiker v.
Morel and Dr. Vouga.97 Plaintiff was under Dr. Vouga's care;
the plaintiff's father-in-law, Morel, consulted the doctor, unknown to the plaintiff, about his patient's health; he had been
demobilized, and his wife complained of his bits of inebriety.
The doctor consented to give Morel a certificate to the effect
that his son-in-law should be sent to an inebriates' home, and
actually handed it over to Morel. The plaintiff, hearing of this,
tried to get this certificate back, as damaging his character;
failing he brought this action for violation of his right of privacy, asking for the return of the certificate. It was held, first,
that the doctor had been guilty of breach of confidence, and
that the remedy sought would be granted.
OThe translation of this new Chinese Code has been furnished us
by Messrs. Yab andj Chang, who also inform us that within the last
year a case has been decided in Shanghai which has attracted considerable attention' An actress was allowed to restrain the use of her
name and picture without her consent, on a cigarette carton. The case
is much like our "picture-ad" cases.
Gartside v. Outran (1856), 3 Jut.N. S. 39.
Section 28.
"Page 114.
013. des T., 1919, D. F., 88.
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The German Civil Code98 'has a provision which might
plausibly be held to protect some of the phases of privacy although we have found no case in point. The Code provides:
"When the right to the use of a name is disputed by another as
against the rightful bearer, or when the interest of the rightful
bearer is injured by another, who illegally uses the same name,
the rightful bearer may demand of the other the discontinuance
of this infringement. If further injuries are to be. anticipated,
he may sue to cause them to be discontinued."
In addition the Codes of the Kingdom of Siam 99 and of
China 00 have provisions against the "disclosures of secrets"
by breaking open letters, telegrams, and documents and disclosing the contents.
But by far the most extensive recognitioi" of the right of
privacy is found in India. Kenny in his case-book on Tortsoa
reports this very interesting case from India. In Gokal Prasad
v. Radlwloob, Edge, C. J., said: "Owing to differences in the
conditions of domestic life this custom, perfectly reasonable in
India, is unknown in England. But in thege provinces of India
Pard& (seclusion of ladies) has for centuries been strictly observed by all Hindus except those of the lowest castes, and by
all Mohammadans except the poorest. The male relations of the
parda-nashin woman-and the woman herself-would consider
it a disgrace were her face to be exposed to the gaze of male
strangers. . . . In the hot weather, great numbers of pardanashin women are compelled by the climate to sleep in the open
air, that is, in the courtyards or verandahs of their houses. A
neighbor should not be allowed to open new doors or -windows
in such a way as would substantially interfere with those parts
of his neighbor's premises whicl are used by parda-nashin
women of the latter's family. . . . To deprive this neighbor's old building of the privacy which has been enjoyed, would
deprive it of all residential value and in this way depreciate its
market price. Such a right of privacy exists in these Provinces
by custom; and any substantial interference with that right,
affords the owner of the dominant tenement a good cause of
"Section 12.
N Chapter 2, section 279.
114Chapter 27, section 333.

10a Page 367.
Imb L L. R. 10 Allahabad 358.
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action." Thus in India the law prevents observation as well as
publication of the details of family life.
Kenny adds that, "In England no such right to freedom
from observation exists nor can it even be acquired by prescription. So it was in vain that a dentist in 1904 sought for legal
protection against 'the annoyance and indignity' to which a
neighboring family at Balham were subjecting him by placing
in their garden an arrangement of large mirrors which enabled
them to observe all that passed in his study and his operating
room."
LImITATIONS TO THE RIGHT

Several limitations were predicted for the right of privacy:
The right of privacy does not prohibit publication of n3atter
(1)
of public or general interest.
(2)
The right of privacy does not prohibit communication of
matter under circumstances rendering it privileged according to the
rules of libel and slander.
There 4s no redress for invasion of privacy by oral publica(3)
tion.
(4) The right of privacy ceases on publication of facts by the
individual or with his Consent.
(5)
Truth is no defense to an action for invasion of privacy.
(6)
Lack of malice is no defense.

These limitations were advocated when the doctrine was
first advanced 1 ' and have since received judicial recognition
in toto.10 2 This judicial recognition of exact limitations for the
right by this late case does much to meet the objection which
was made to the earlier cases that they did not define any limitations. 0 3
Of these several limitations none has been so thoroughly
discussed in the cases and so often misunderstood by the courts
as this one: "The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest." Of
course this distinction has a sound foundation. But it is quite
possible that some of the courts have carried the distinction too
far. All such cases profess to acknowledge the general right of
privacy yet the distinction which some of them draw between
private and public characters is so sharp as to raise the question
whether this distinction has not been seized upon as a conven-

10
4 Harvard Law Review
1

193, 214, 216, 217, 218.
1'Brents v. Morgan (1927), 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967.
10 28 Yale Law Journal 270.
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ient escape from applying the general rule. It is the "public
interest" in the matter published rather than the fact that it is
published about a so-called public character which invests the
case -with immunity from violating the right of privacy.
It is clear that the proposers of this limitation had in mind
the parallel limitation in the law of libel of qualified privilege
of comment and criticism on matters of public interest. A part
of the confusion has come from the first case which stresses this
feature of the right.10 4 However, the opinion has been expressed' 0 5 that the decision and the argument in this case were
inflenced by a similar discussion in an earlier New York case.10 6
In the Corliss case the court said: "I cannot consent to the proposition that Mr. Corliss was a private character. . . . A
statesman, author, artist or inventor, who asks for and desires
public recognition may be said to have surrendered this right to'
the public."
It is interesting to note the opinion of the Michigan court
in a later case in which it denied the right of privacy, but commenting on this part of the Corliss case said: "We are loath to
believe that the man who makes himself useful to mankind surrenders any right to privacy thereby, or that he permits his picture to be published by one person, and for one person, he is
forever thereafter precluded from enjoying any of his rights.
Just when a man becomes a benefactor to the publid, so as to
have this effect is not stated; but we see no reason for so treating Mr. Corliss, to the exclusion of myriads of people who, in a
modest but effective way, perform public duties, or philanthropic
acts or functions in which the public are interested. ' 10 7 Similar and much more caustic satires on the distinction taken in
the Corliss case have been written by law publicists.' 08
This decision confronted the attorneys for the plaintiff in
the famous Vassar College case "0 9 and they purposely cast
104Corliss v. Walker (1893), 57 Fed. 434, (1894), 64 Fed. 280, 31 L.
R. A. 283.
11 12 Columbia Law Review 698.
,SclhuyZer v. Curtis, supra notes 17 and 18.
ImAtkinson v. Doherty (1899), 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285, 46 L.
R. A. 219. Discussed supra note 10.
" 39 American Law Review 37, or again in 89 A. S. R. 849, where
It is said: "Such a rule obviously places a premium on mediocrity and
Incompetence."
1- (1912), 197 Fed. 982. See also Colyer v. Fox Pub. Co., (1914),
162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999.
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their action on grounds other than the right of privacy. Nevertheless the court went out of. its way to re-affirm the distinction
made in the Corliss case. In that case the defendant manufactured and sold a brand of candy called "Vassar Chocolates"
which it advertised widely, employing the name "Vassar" together with a likeness of a young lady in scholastic garb and
wearing a mortarboard hat, also using an imitation of the college pennant, a college yell, and imitation of the college seal,
with the words "Vassar Chocolates" an& "Always Fresh" substituted for the words "Vassar College" and "Purity and
Wisdom." Refusing Vassar College an injunction restraining
the use of its name and insignia, the court placed its decision
on the dual ground that as a corporation, Vassar College had no
such property right in its name as to maintain the injunction
and, secondly, the privacy element referred to above. In connection with this latter part the court says: "The injury was
psychological rather than real." To this extent the court evidences a bias against the right of privacy on the ground that it
would afford a remedy for injured feelings. The propounders
of the doctrine of privacy and the cou-ts which first recognized
it had to deal with this same problem, namely, that a legal remedy
for such an injury seemed- to involve the treatment of mere
wounded feeling as a substantive cause of action. This matter
was gone into very thoroughly and it was pointed out that if the
invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injury, the elements for
demanding redress already exist, since already the value of
mental suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation. 11o
Within the last year a case has been decided in the Alaskan
court which involves again this element of pvblic interest."'
An injunction was sought to restrain a photographer from taking pictures of the movements of a North Pole expedition. The
obviois fear of the plaintiff was that the defendant would take
pictures and give them to the rival of a motion picture company

"' 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 213. See also Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbances as Legal Damage, 20 Michigan Law Review 497. The first
court to recognize privacy had to face this objection also because an
earlier case in that jurisdiction had said: "The civil law is a practical
business system and does not undertake to redress psychological injuries," Chapman v. Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S. E. 901.
" Smith v. Surratt (1928), 7 Alaska 416. Compare the case of
Sports and General Press Agency v. "Our gongs" Pub. Cb., (1917), 2 K.
.B. 125.
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to whom the plaintiff had granted exclusive picture rights and
from whom he was receiving substdntial financial aid. The
court refused the injunction on the ground that the expedition
112
was a matter of public interest.
In the light of these decisions there seems to be a danger
that the distinction between public and private characters may
be a misconception of the original limiiation in this regard as
outlined by Brandeis. It has been suggested that "by occupying a public position or by making an appeal to the public, a
person surrenders such part of his personality as pertains to or
affects the position which he fills or seeks- to occupy, but no further. "113 It is submitted that a still better criterion would be
to make the test the public interest in the matter published
rather then the public interest in the person about whom it is
published, or even, the public interest in the position which
such person occupies. The public character of a person's life
or position, cannot deprive him of the right to be protected
against libel. This phase is only helpful as an aid in determining whether the matter published is harmful or justifiable under
the circumstances. It should not be otherwise with the right of
privacy.
REMEIs

More attention is given in this discussion to the limitations
on the right and the remedies for the violation of the right than
is usual, for, as Dean Pound has said, there is no doubt but that'
the right of privacy should be recognized, but "the problems
are rather to devise suitable redress and to limit the right in
view of other interests involved.''114
There are two remedies which are available in case of the
violation of the right of privacy, namely, tort action for damages, and injunction. There is no problem so far as the former
is concerned, once the right itself is recognized. The cases which
have refused damages, when damages alone were asked, have all
been cases in which the refusal was placed on the sole ground
that the right did not exist. This aspect is the more interestingwhen we consider the cases in which an injunction was asked.
I See comment on this case in one of the forthcoming Issues of the
Michigan Law Review (1928).
39 American Law Review 37, 49.
1128 Harvard Law Review 343, 364.
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It is worthy of note that in the first two cases recognizing the
right of privacy, 115 in the two recent cases which have extended
the application of the right, 116 and in a majority of the cases
which have upheld the right, damages alone were asked. In
contradistinction, an injunction was asked in the New York
case which first repudiated the right. 17 To be sure, the case is
placed on the ground that no such right existed, but we cannot
.help but wonder whether the court did not anticipate the secondary problem of remedies.
The difficulty, real or imaginary, in regard to remedies
concerns the use of the injunction. It is not within the scope
of this article to consider the problem in detail, nor would it be
advisable, as there have been several exhaustive articles on this
phase alone. 118 Briefly stated, the bugaboo which faces the
courts is the theory that equity has jurisdiction to protect only
property rights. 1" 9 It has been said that it is in connection
with the right of privacy that the doctrine that the jurisdiction
of equity is confined to the protection of rights of property seems
to have originated. 20 The conflict has been made doubly perspicuous from the fact that the right of privacy has been asserted to be a strictly personal right from its very cradle.
What have the courts done in such a predicament? Well,
for the most part they have followed the lead of the classic case
of Gee v. Pritchard'2 1 (the original case for the theory that
equity has no jurisdiction of personal rights), and have transformed what was to all intents and purposes a personal right by
a legal fiction into a property right. While upholding the right of
privacy they have sought for and found a "nominal property in-

terest. "122
cases are cited in notes 50 and 53 supra.
u These cases are cited in notes 130 and 133 infra.
"'These

Cited supra note 23.

Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harvard Law Review 640; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to
Protect Personal Rights, 33 Yale Law Journal 115, and 122ff, especially;
Chafee, The Progress of Law, 34 Harvard Law Review 388, 407-415; and
lengthy note in 14 A. L. R. 295.
See 14 A. L. R. 296 for a list of cases so holding.
33 Yale Law Journal 122.

(1818) 2 Swanst 402.
'21Munden v. Harris (1910), 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076;
Venderbilt v. Mitchell (1907), 72 N. J. E. 910, 67 A. 103; Efison v. Edison Mfg. Co., (1910), 73 N. J. E. 910, 67 A. 103. See the statement of
Dill, J., in 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 919, 67 A. 97, in which he says: "In many
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What should the courts do in such a case? They should
cease what Dean Pound has called, their "unintelligent adherence to the dicta of a great judge in the pioneer case.''123 And
it is interesting to note that this is precisely what the courts
are doing. As has been said: "It appears that there is a growing tendency on the part of the courts to repudiate the theory
that equity has jurisdiction to protect and enforce only property rights, and expressly to recognize the doctrine that personal
rights stand on at least as high a plane as property rights, and
often cannot bd adequately protected except in -a court of
equity. "124 There is no reason why the mandates of preventive
justice should not override an antiquated technicality as far as
the rights of personality are concerned. And it so happens that
the development of the right of privacy is the particular aspect
of personality which has wrought the "first determined onslaught on the oft-repeated dhctrine that equity protects only
125
rights of property."
It is believed that the New York statute by its influence will
accentuate the tendency of the law in this direction. Whereas
the influence of the New York statute has been bad in creating
the idea that the right of privacy was exclusively limited to the
typical "picture-ad" case, 126 the influence of the statute should
be good in respect to remedies, for it explicitly gives both the
remedies of damages and injunction, and almost all of the cases
brought under the statute have included a prayer for an injunction.
RECENT DEVELOPmENT OF THE RIGHT

Now for a consideration of the late cases which are significant in marking a change from the rather stereotyped cases in
which the right was invoked previously. The rough outlines of
this growth have already been suggested at the beginning of this
cases courts have striven to uphold the equitable jurisdiction upon
ground of some property right, however slender and shadowy, and the
tendency of the courts is to afford more adequate protection to plrsonal rights and to that end to lay hold of slight circumstances tending
to show a technical property right."
z 29 Harvard Law Review 640, 641.
14 A. L. R. 295;
Chafee, The Progress of Law, and especially the section entitled,
The Extension of Equitable Jurisdiction beyond the Protection of Property Rights, 34 Harvard Law Review 407-415.
ul See note 3 and text at that point. -
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article. We have already suggested that as soon as the recognition of new rights or of new channels of redress has become
sure, men attempt in every conceivable way and even by the use..
of fictions to utilize the new-found protection to meet existing
needs. It is entirely to be expected that a stage should finally
be reached where "the interposition of the courts cannot depend
on the particular nature of the injuries resulting." Let us now
elaborate on this point. A case which has come before the United
States Supreme Court recently 127 furnishes a good .example of
the attempt to utilize the newly recognized right and also furnishes a splendid introduction to the most recent cases where
the identical object has been achieved.
In an attack on the constitutionality of the so-called Service
Letter Acts the defendant set up the right of privacy as a defense to an action brought against it by a former employee to
whom it had refused a letter of recommendation. The Service
Letter Act provided in substance that corporations should be
required to issue letters to resigned or discharged employees
stating the character and length of their service. The defendant
corporation along with a variety of other defenses contended
that the relations between a corporation and its employees were
4 matter of wholly private concern and that as such they were
entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, for,
said they, "liberty of silence" is as much guaranteed as its
counterpart and correlative, freedom of speech. Of course the
argument fell down in that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
no restrictions on the States in regard to freedom of speech even,
as 'the Supreme Court pointed out. 1 28 Nevertheless the case
shows to what extent men will go to use the right.
The two late cases which extend the right are furnished by
Georgia and Kentuckiy. The cases were decided in 1924 and
1927 respectively. An interesting parallel is furnished by the
fact that the first two jurisdictions to recognize the right of
'"PrudentialIns. Co. v. Cheek (1922), 259 U. S. 530. See also 10
Harvard Law Review 179, for a 'suggestion as to possible newer phases
of privacy.
=But see Statement of Sandford, J., in Gitlow v. People of State
of NV.Y., (1925), 268 U. S. 652, 666. in which he says, "We may and do
assume that freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by
the First Amendments from abridgement by Congress are among the
fundamental rights and liberties protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
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privacy were Georgia and Kentucky, and that the dates of recognition were 1904 and 1907 respectively. 1 9
In the Georgia case of Byfield v. Candler,1 ° the defendant
was a passenger on the same steamship with the plaintiff and
her husband. These latter two had gone to their stateroom to
retire for the night, but before retiring the husband left the
room for a short while. During his absence the defendant entered the room and attempted to rape the plaintiff. However
the screams of the plaintiff attracted her husband and he rushed
back into the room and ejected the intruder after a terrific
fight. The court instructed the jury: "I charge you that this
action is for assault and battery upon the plaintiff and not for
entering the plaintiff's room." This instruction was held error
as the intrusion into the plaintiff's room constituted a violation
of her right of privacy. The court said: "A passenger upon a
vessel is entitled to the privacy of the room to which he or she
is assigned, as against the improper, unjustified or unreasonable
intrusions of others, and a violation thereof will give rise to an
action. A violation of such right of the plaintiff, constituting
a lesser wrong, would be embraced within an entire greater
wrong, such as alleged in the petition, and the judge erred in
giving the instruction complained of."
We have seen how the right of privacy was recognized by
the Georgia court some years previously and that in that instance
reliance was placed upon analogy to prior existing rights. Once
recognized, however, what course should the development take?
It may become either independent in character or interrelated to
prior existing rights, or, again, the development may take both
of these courses. The "picture-ad" cases evidence rather the
former type of development, while this case and the next case
considered evidence the latter type. The right has been used to
bolster up other analogous rights in places where restrictions,
either technical or otherwise, appeared to obstruct clear justice.
Now in the present case slight evidence of consent on the
part of the plaintiff jeopardized her case if placed solely on
the theory of assault and battery. Yet the demands of justice
clearly seemed in her favor when we consider the case as a
See notes 7 and 8 supra for these earlier cases.
(1924), 160 Ga. 732, 125 S. E. 905.
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whole. i s i go in this.instance the right of privacy was used as
a kind oi last resort, or catch-all, for the plaintiff's case. In this
respect the right of privacy temporarily usurped the place which
would usually have been taken by the common law action on
the case. As a notd writer has said: "Yet it (the right of privacy) comprehends as actionable, something less than an assault.
It is not .quite a trespass to the person, and, since the plaintiff is a mere licensee on the steamship and not actually in
possession of the premises, it is not a tresspass quare clausum.
fregit. But, after all, would not this conduct by the defendant
have been actionable at common law in an action on the case, as
an interference with the plaintiff in the exclusive enjoyment of
the license to occupy, together with her husband, that portion
of the steamship assigned to them 1132
The other and more' recent extension of the doctrine was
made by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Brents v.
AMorgan, deqided November 15, 1927.133 Some idea of the importance dttached to the decision may le gained from the
number of comments it has occasioned in the various law periodicals over the country. 134 In this case the defendant garage
keeper exhibited in a conspicuous place in his show window a
sign, five feet by eight feet in size, which read: "Notice. Dr.
W. R. Morgan owes an account here of $49.67. And if promises
would pay an account, this account would have been paid long
ago. This account will be advertised as long as it remains
unpaid." There is a statute in Kentucky which makes truth a
complete defense in an action of libel,13 5 so the plaintiff in this

"'

The petition makes the following allegations: "When petitioner's
husband had left her, the stateroom door was closed, the light was
turned out, and she was prepared to sleep. A short time after the
petitioner's husband had left her, said defendant opened the door, tore
the bedclothing off of her, disheveled her nightclothes, grabbed her In
his arms and sought to get in bed with her for the purpose of debauch-

Ing her."

1 10 Minnesota Law Review "55, 57. It is interesting to note that
damages were allowed in an actio4 on the case against a doctor for
bringing a non-physician to attend childbirth in a Michigan case decided in 1881. See note 12a supra.
221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967.
"'13
Cornell Law Quarterly 469-73; 41 Harvard Law Review
1070-1; 16 Kentucky Law Journal 364-6; 26 Michigan Law Review
682-4; 12 Minnesota Law Review 426; 1 Southern California Law Review
293-7; 6 Tennessee Law Review 291-4; 14 Virginia Law Review 652-6;
37 Yale Law Journal 835-6.
1 Civil Code, section 124.
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case admitted the truth of the statement and cast his case
squarely on the right of privacy. The court held that a good
cause of action for a violation of the right of privacy had been
stated.
The court, speaking through Logan, J., said: "A new
branch of. the law has been developed in the last few years
which has found place in the text-books and the opinions of the
courts which is denominated the right of privacy. It has not
been concretely defined, and probably is not subject to a concrete definition, but it is generally recognized as the right to be
let alone, .that is, the right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity, or the right to live without unwarrranted interference by the public about matters with which the public is
We are content to hold that
.
not necessarily concerned. .
there is a right of privacy, and that the unwarranted invasion of
such right may be made the subject of an action in tort to recover damages for such unwarranted invasion."
Now in this case the restriction which obstructed the fullest
usefulness of the law of libel which would have controlled,
ordinarily, was the code provision that truth is a complete defense to libel. But this is not the only element which rendered
the law of libel inadequate in the present case. Even if there
had been, as there is in a few states,1 3 6 a provision that truth
is only a defense when the publication is for justifiable purposes, the law of libel would have been of no aid unless the
plaintiff proved special damage.' 3 7 As has been said: "This
situation demonstrates the inadequacy of the law of lilel to protect the individual against unwarranted publicity of his private
affairs. The court avoided this difficulty by considering the
injury as an invasion of the right of privacy, a right which it
had previously recognized. "138
The question has been raised whether the doctrine that
truth is a defense in a civil action of libel will be rendered a
nullity by the right of privacy. 1 9 In a like manner it was early
IFlorida Publishing Co. v. Lee (1918), 76 Fla. 405, 80 So. 245;
Hutchins v. Page (1909), 75 1. H. 215, 72 A. 289, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.)
132. In the former case the object was achieved by statute; in the
latter by judicial decision.
41 Harvard Law Review 1071.
Id.

1 Southern California Law Review 293.
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.sensed that the recognition of the right .of privacy might be
"the virtual extension of the law of libel.''140 However, this
is not a valid objection to recognizing the right, as the need of
such extension has been voiced in several statutes on libel By
some of these truth is made only a qualified defense. 141 By
others the law of libel is so liberalized as to overlap in part the
right of privacy, without labelling it as such. A statute
passed in California in 1899 is an example of this latter type
of statute: "It shall likewise be unlawful to publish in any
newspaper, handbill, poster, book or serial publication or supplement thereto, any caricature of any person residing in this
State, which will in any manner reflect upon the honor, integr-ity, manhood, virtue, reputation or business or political motives of the person so caricatured to public hatred, ridicule or
contempt."'1 42 Of course this statute overdid the matter but
it was at least expressive of the need of an extension of the
law of libel. Yet another expression of this need is found in
a different form in the Minnesota statute passed in 1925 which
makes the business of publishing and circulating scandalous and
defamatory newspapers a public nuisance which equity may enjoin.14 8 Consider also such statutes as the "insulting words"
statute in Virginia. It is submitted that this new use of the
right of privacy will help to extend the law of libel in places
where it needs extension, and that the law of privacy will parallel the law of libel as to matters about which the present rules
are sound and adequate, as for instance, the matter of privilege
or the relation to freedom of speech and press.
By way of summary we may note that New York, Rhode
Island, Washington, and Michigan have rejected the right of
privacy, and that in the first named state only, the situation
resulting from rejection has occasioned a statute which has
proved an inadequate and unsatisfactory method of handling
the problem. We have pointed out that the several reasons
given by the courts for rejection are clearly unsound. On the
other hand the following jurisdictions have given the right un'39 American Law Review 37-58.
24 See note 136 supra.
'4 See Adams, The Right of Privacy and Its Relation to the
Law of
Libel, 39 American Law Review 37, 53.
2 This statute Is outlined In State v. Guiltord (1928), 219 N. W.
(Minn.) 770.
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qualified recognition as a common law right entitled to protection: Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey, Missouri, and Kansas.
In addition we find varying degrees of recognition in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Texas, and Massachusetts. The cases in all of these
latter states would indicate a more complete recognition when
the proper case shall be presented. The English courts have
chosen to handle the matter by extending and even stretching
the existing principles of law rather than by recognizing a new
principle or right. But as we have pointed out, the two
methods, the American and the English, may finally reach the
same end, for in the former case the right of privacy which has
been recognized is again interrelating itself with the prior
existing rights, and in so doing extending other fields of law in
places where an extension is needed. We have also given a
partial picture of the status of the right of privacy in France,
Germany, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Siam, Turkey, China,
and India. Six limitations of the right have been suggested by
law publicists and more lately recognized as a whole and
separately by the courts. In regard to only one of these limitations has any difficulty arisen thus far, and a solution is suggested for that diffidulty. The remedies for violation of the
right are two, namely, tort action for damages and injunction;
the later cases evidence a decided trend away from any technicalities which would restrict the usefulness of the latter remedy.
Finally, we hav6 noticed such an enlarged application of the
doctrine in Georgia and Kentucky that we are led to wonder if
a new period of quite general extension of application of the
right of privacy has not been entered upon which may parallel
the period of recognition of the right which came some quarter
of a century earlier.
In conclusion we might ask, what of the future? How
will the right of privacy be affected by the anticipated mechanisms of television? Or, again, a possible combination of the
mechanisms of television and the fluoroscope? Will the right
give way under such possibilities or will the day of its utmost
usefulness just begin? Of course such questions are purely
conjectural, yet they present problems, which, added to the
ever-present dangers from scurrilous journalism, and the need
of additional avenues of expansion for some of the technicality-
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ridden fields of tort law, may make the right of privacy of unusual importance in the years just ahead.
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

